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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Geoffrey Claude Coleman appeals from the district court’s denial of his Idaho 
Criminal Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Coleman was involved in a Christmas-day dispute at his father’s house.  (See 
generally, Tr. vol. I, pp. 99-182.)  It was alleged that while they were arguing outside 
Coleman pushed his father to the ground and ran him over with an ATV.  (Tr. vol. I, p. 
123, L. 10 – p. 133, L. 15.)  It was also alleged that Coleman went inside and pointed a 
gun to his own head, and damaged the walls within the house.  (Tr. vol. I, p. 155, Ls. 8-
17; p. 159, L. 16 – p. 160, L. 2.)  As a result Coleman was charged with aggravated 
battery, exhibition of a deadly weapon, grand theft, and misdemeanor malicious injury to 
property.  (R., pp. 47-49.) 
 The case went to trial.  During the trial, Coleman’s father testified that after the 
ATV incident Coleman left the scene.  (Tr. vol. I, p. 146, Ls. 15-21.)  Coleman’s father 
then called law enforcement.  (Tr. vol. I, p. 148, Ls. 5-12.)  After speaking to the officer 
who arrived on scene, Coleman’s father went inside to put firewood in the kitchen.  (Tr. 
vol. I, p. 151, Ls. 3-10.) 
 Coleman returned to the house.  (Tr. vol. I, p. 151, Ls. 11-25.)  He entered the 
kitchen with a gun and “was in a rage”; his father testified that Coleman’s “eyes were 
wild, and he was waving the pistol around.”  (Tr. vol. I, p. 152, Ls. 8-12; p. 155, Ls. 8-
13.)  Coleman did not point the gun at his father, but he did turn the gun on himself, 
pointing it at his own head and saying “Dad, I am going crazy, I am losing my mind.”  
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(Tr. vol. I, p. 155, Ls. 13-17.)  Coleman demanded to know the whereabouts of his dog 
and demanded his father’s aid in getting his truck out of the snow.  (Tr. vol. I, p. 156, L. 1 
– p. 157, L. 22.)  After they successfully freed the truck, Coleman departed again. (Tr. 
vol. I, p. 164, Ls. 11-16.)   
There was no evidence presented that any persons other than Coleman and 
Coleman’s father were in the kitchen while Coleman was displaying the gun.  (See 
generally, Tr. vol. I, pp. 83-196; Tr. vol. II, pp. 289-318.) 
 After the presentation of the state’s case Coleman made a Rule 29 motion for a 
judgment of acquittal.  (Tr. vol. I, p. 190, L. 21 – p. 195, L. 13.)  He argued that the state 
failed to prove its Exhibition of a Deadly Weapon charge: 
I would like to make a Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal under Idaho 
Criminal Rule 29 as to Count II, Exhibition of a Deadly Weapon. 
 
One of the elements of the crime is that it occur in the presence of two or 
more persons.  The evidence that’s been presented today is that Richard 
Coleman and Geoffrey Coleman were the only two people who were 
present at the time. 
 
I interpret the statute to require to be two persons other than the defendant 
in order for someone to be guilty of exhibition of a deadly weapon.  So I 
move to dismiss that charge. 
 
(Tr. vol. I, p. 190, L. 21 – p. 191, L. 7 (emphasis added).) 
The state countered that “[t]he statute doesn’t say the defendant and somebody 
else, it doesn’t say two other people other than the defendant,” and that therefore “the 
defendant is included in that two or more persons.”  (Tr. vol. I, p. 192, Ls. 6-8, 24-25.)  
The district court agreed with the state: 
The wording is—I can see how you could certainly make the argument 
that Ms. Brooks is making but—and if it said in the presence of two or 
more witnesses, I would agree. 
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But exhibition or use of a deadly weapon, the case law makes it clear it is a 
lesser included of aggravated assault. 
 
And clearly aggravated assault just requires two people, two or more.  You 
have to have the person with a weapon and the person is assaulted. 
 
And the way I read the statute is that they’re just trying to make it clear 
that if you are exhibiting a weapon in a rude, angry and threatening 
manner and you’re the only one there, that maybe somebody took a video 
of it somehow or a picture, or caught it on camera, that doesn’t constitute 
the crime. 
 
(Tr. vol. I, p. 194, L. 18 – p. 195, L. 9.)  The district court concluded the statute’s 
reference to “two or more persons can include the person with the weapon,” and denied 
the motion.  (Tr. vol. I, p. 195, Ls. 10-13.) 
 The jury acquitted Coleman of aggravated battery, grand theft, and malicious 
injury to property, but found him guilty of exhibition of a deadly weapon.  (Tr. vol. II, p. 
382, L. 19 – p. 383, L. 5.)  Coleman timely appealed from the judgment of conviction.  
(R., pp. 176, 179-81, 187-91.) 
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ISSUE 
 
Coleman states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Coleman’s Idaho Criminal 
Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal regarding the exhibition of a 
deadly weapon count? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Coleman failed to show the district court erroneously concluded there was sufficient 
evidence to sustain a conviction for exhibition of a deadly weapon? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
Because There Was Ample Evidence That Coleman Exhibited A Deadly Weapon In The 
Presence Of Two Persons—Himself And His Father—The District Court Did Not Err In 
Denying His Rule 29 Motion For A Judgment Of Acquittal 
 
A. Introduction 
 Coleman’s appeal focuses on one element of Idaho Code § 18-3303, which 
criminalizes the exhibition of a deadly weapon “in the presence of two (2) or more 
persons.”  He contends that the “the plain language of Section 18-3303 contemplates the 
prohibited act would occur when a defendant so displays a deadly weapon in the presence 
of two or more persons, other than the defendant.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)  Coleman 
argues that because the state’s evidence only showed that Coleman displayed the gun to 
his father, there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 
8-12.) 
 But this argument fails because the plain meaning of “two (2) or more persons” is 
“two or more persons”—not “two or more other persons” or “two or more persons, other 
than the defendant.”  Because Coleman and his father are two persons, evidence that 
Coleman exhibited the gun in his and his father’s presence was therefore ample evidence 
to sustain his conviction for exhibition of a deadly weapon. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
In reviewing the denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal this Court 
looks to “whether there was substantial evidence upon which a trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Hoyle, 
140 Idaho 679, 684, 99 P.3d 1069, 1074 (2004); see State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 
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170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007); see State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 
1992).  This Court views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and 
we do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury regarding the credibility of the 
witnesses, the weight of the evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence.”  Oliver, 144 Idaho at 724, 170 P.3d at 387; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 
822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 
(Ct. App. 1987).  The facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are therefore 
construed in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict.  See Oliver, 144 Idaho at 724, 170 P.3d 
at 387; see also Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. 
“The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which this Court exercises 
free review.”  Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, Preston Sch. Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 13–14, 
105 P.3d 671, 673–74 (2004) (citing Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526, 528, 81 P.3d 
1236, 1238 (2003)). 
C. The Plain Meaning Of “Two Or More Persons” Is “Two Or More Persons,” And 
The State Presented Sufficient Evidence That Coleman Exhibited A Deadly 
Weapon In The Presence Of Two Persons—Himself And His Father 
 
 Statutory interpretation “must begin with the literal words of the statute; those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be 
construed as a whole.  If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but 
simply follows the law as written.”  Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 
Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 
362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003) (citations omitted)).  This Court has “consistently held that 
where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence 
should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the 
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legislature.” Id. (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 
P.2d 961, 963 (1993)). 
Idaho Code § 18-3303 criminalizes exhibition of a deadly weapon: 
 
Every person who, not in necessary self-defense, in the presence of two (2) 
or more persons, draws or exhibits any deadly weapon in a rude, angry and 
threatening manner, or who, in any manner, unlawfully uses the same, in 
any fight or quarrel, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
 
Here, the meaning of “two (2) or more persons” is plain.  A “person” is “a human 
being.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  “Presence” is defined as “[t]he 
quality, state, or condition of being in a particular time and place, particularly with 
reference to some act that was done then and there,” or as “close physical proximity 
coupled with awareness.”  Id.  Applying those plain definitions Coleman was necessarily 
in the presence of two persons—himself and his father—when he brandished the gun.  
Ample evidence therefore sustained a charge of exhibiting a deadly weapon, as the 
district court correctly found. 
Coleman argues that “the plain language of Section 18-3303 contemplates the 
prohibited act would occur when a defendant so displays a deadly weapon in the presence 
of two or more persons, other than the defendant.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 9 (emphasis 
added).)  But this explanation encapsulates the error: Coleman’s proposed definition tacks 
on a modifying clause that is nowhere in the text.  The statute does not say “two or more 
persons other than the defendant.”  See I.C. § 18-3303.  Nor does the text make any other 
indication that the defendant would be exempt from the headcount of persons.  See id.  
To the extent Coleman’s search for meaning takes him to non-statutory language, by 
definition he has already departed beyond its plain language.    Staying within the bounds 
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of the text leads to a different outcome—the statute says “two (2) or more persons,” 
which, by plain definition, includes the defendant.1 
 Coleman claims the decision in State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 726 P.2d 772 (Ct. 
App. 1986), supports a plain reading of “two (2) or more persons” that excludes the 
defendant.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-11.)  There, the Idaho Court of Appeals considered, 
among other things, whether a district court erred by “refusing to give a defense 
instruction on exhibiting a deadly weapon.”  Mason, 111 Idaho at 668, 726 P.2d at 780.  
Mason was charged with aggravated assault and contended “that exhibiting a dangerous 
weapon is a lesser included offense.”  Id.  The district court ultimately concluded that 
exhibiting a deadly weapon would be a lesser included offense because there it was 
“necessarily committed in the commission of” the aggravated assault.  Id. at 669, 726 
P.2d at 781. 
But, relevant to the issue in this case, the Mason Court also considered whether 
the “essential elements” of exhibition of a deadly weapon were “charged in the 
information as the manner or means by which the [aggravated assault] offense was 
committed”: 
Taking the latter point first, here not all of the essential elements of the 
crime of exhibiting a deadly weapon were included among the allegations 
in the information filed against Mason. The information alleged that 
Mason 
 
knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the apparent 
ability to do so, commit[ted] an intentional, unlawful threat to do 
violence to the person of another, by word and act against one 
Patricia Stapleton, with a deadly weapon, without the intent to kill 
                                            
1 And, per Verska, this plain meaning controls even if this Court concludes it is patently 
absurd or would produce absurd results if construed as written.  151 Idaho at 896, 265 at 
509. 
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and created a well-founded fear that such violence was imminent, to-
wit: The said James Mason pointed a handgun at the said Patricia 
Stapleton and threatened to blow her guts out. 
 
Under I.C. § 18–3303, the crime of exhibiting a deadly weapon is not 
committed unless the exhibition occurs “in the presence of two (2) or more 
persons.” Thus the presence of two or more people is an essential element 
of the crime. Here that element was not contained in the allegations of the 
information; therefore the crime of exhibiting a deadly weapon was not an 
included offense under the theory that its elements were charged “as the 
manner or means” of the assault. 
 
Id. at 668–69, 726 P.2d at 780–81. 
 The Mason Court’s conclusion would not affect the plain meaning of “two or 
more persons.”  There, the question before the Court was whether the elements of 
exhibition “were charged ‘as the manner or means’ of the assault.”  Id.  The Mason Court 
did not engage in any statutory construction to define “two (2) or more persons,” much 
less did it consider the plain language of the statute.  See id.  Consequently, the Mason 
decision’s examination of a charging document did not define “two (2) or more persons” 
to exclude the defendant, and even if it could be so construed it was wrongly decided, as 
this definition ignores the statute’s plain language. 
By its plain language Section 18-3303 prohibits exhibiting a deadly weapon in the 
presence of two or more persons.  The evidence at trial established that Coleman angrily 
brandished a gun in the presence of two persons: himself and his father.  The district 
court therefore correctly found there was sufficient evidence to sustain Coleman’s 
conviction for exhibition of a deadly weapon. 
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D. Alternatively, Even If “Two Or More Persons” Is Ambiguous, It Should Be 
Construed To Include The Defendant 
 
Where a statute’s words “are subject to more than one meaning, it is ambiguous 
and this Court must construe the statute ‘to mean what the legislature intended it to mean. 
To determine that intent, [this Court] examine[s] not only the literal words of the statute, 
but also the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the 
statute, and its legislative history.’”  Ada Cty. Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 
Idaho 138, 395 P.3d 357, 361 (2017) (quoting Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 148 Idaho 
427, 430, 224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009)).  A “fundamental principle of statutory construction” 
is that “the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from 
the context in which it is used.”  Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993).  Courts 
“follow the cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole” because “the meaning of 
statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.”  King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 
U.S. 215, 221 (1991). 
Here, even if this Court finds it ambiguous whether “two (2) or more persons” 
includes the defendant, principles of construction support a conclusion that it does. 
 Starting with the statute itself, reading its text holistically supports counting the 
defendant as one of the “persons.”  In the very same sentence as the language at issue, 
Section 18-3303 also criminalizes the unlawful use of a deadly weapon “in any fight or 
quarrel.”  A fight or quarrel, by definition, can be between a defendant and only one other 
person.  In light of the full context of the statute it makes much more sense that the 
legislature would criminalize both the unlawful use of a deadly weapon in a fight with 
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one other person, and the unlawful exhibition of the weapon in the presence of one other 
person.   
Coleman’s proposed construction, on the other hand, would prohibit the unlawful 
use of a weapon in a fight with one other person, but only prohibit the unlawful 
exhibition of a weapon to a group of two other persons.  Under Coleman’s calculus 
defendants could not exhibit a deadly weapon to a crowd but would have free reign to 
angrily exhibit a gun to another individual.  This interpretation, beyond being internally 
inconsistent, is bad policy: it incentivizes threatening displays of deadly weapons, just as 
long as they occur in private, and one-on-one. 
A review of statutes beyond Section 18-3303 also reveals that “person,” without 
modification, would include the defendant.  For example, neighboring firearm statutes 
show that the legislature capably can, and does, refer to “any other person” when it 
wishes to exclude the defendant.  See, e.g., I.C. §§ 18-3304 (“Any person who shall 
intentionally, without malice, point or aim any firearm at or toward any other person shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor….”); 18-3306 (“Any person who shall maim or injure any 
other person by the discharge of any firearm pointed or aimed, intentionally but without 
malice, at any such person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor….”) (emphases added). 
 And the firearm statutes are not outliers; Idaho’s criminal code, across the board, 
reveals the legislature has no compunction writing “another person,” or just “another,” 
when it wants to exclude the defendant.  See, e.g., I.C. §§ 18-2403 (“A person steals 
property and commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of property …”); 18-
4308 (“Where any ditch, canal, lateral or drain has heretofore been, or may hereafter be, 
constructed across or beneath the lands of another…”); 18-6608 (Every person who, for 
--- ---
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the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse, causes the penetration, however 
slight, of the genital or anal opening of another person…”); 18-6711 (“Every person who 
telephones another …”); 18-7902 (“It shall be unlawful for any person, maliciously and 
with the specific intent to intimidate or harass another person”); 18-8006 (“Any person 
causing great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to any 
person other than himself…”) (emphases added). 
 These examples show that the legislature can and does write “another person” or 
“other person” where it means to exclude the defendant.  Even in obvious cases where 
“person” could only refer to someone other than the defendant—such as victims of 
telephone harassment—the legislature still took pains to write out “another person,” and 
explicitly exclude the defendant.  See I.C. § 18-7902.  Where the legislature does not state 
“another person” the omission must therefore be conscious and intentional, and Section 
18-3303 should be construed accordingly. 
 “[T]wo (2) or more persons” means “two or more persons.”  This includes the 
defendant.  Alternatively, even if this plain language is found ambiguous, sound policy 
and legislative intent supports construing Section 18-3303 to include the defendant.  
Whether the statute is plainly read, or correctly construed, the state provided ample 
evidence that Coleman exhibited a deadly weapon in a rude, angry, or threatening manner 
in the presence of two or more persons.  The district court therefore correctly denied his 
Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. 
 
 
 
--
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Coleman’s judgment of 
conviction. 
 DATED this 15th day of November, 2017. 
 
       
 _/s/ Kale D. Gans_____________ 
 KALE D. GANS 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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